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Abstract—In the power grid, the Balance Responsible Parties
(BRPs) purchase energy based on a forecast of the user con-
sumption. The forecasts are imperfect, and the corrections of
their real-time deviations are managed by a System Operator
(SO), which charges the BRPs for the procured imbalances.
Flexible consumers, associated with a BRP, can be involved
in a demand response (DR) program to reduce the imbalance
costs. However, running the DR program requires the BRP to
invest resources in the infrastructure and increases its operating
costs. To limit the intervention of BRP, we implement the DR
via a blockchain smart contract. Moreover, to reduce the delay
of publication of the imbalance price, caused by the inefficient
accounting process of the current balancing markets, a second
blockchain is adopted at the SO layer, procuring a fast and
auditable credit settlements. The feasibility of the proposed
architecture is evaluated over an Ethereum blockchain platform.
The results show that blockchains can enable a high automation
of the balancing market, by providing (i) the implementation
of aggregators with low operating cost and (ii) the timely and
transparent access to the balancing information, thus fostering
new business models for the BRPs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The massive deployment of intermittent renewable energy
resources into the power grids is increasing the amount of
energy that the System Operators (SOs) contract on the balanc-
ing market in order to match generation and demand in real-
time. The imbalance costs can be compensated by including
small-scale flexible consumers in the electricity market, but
this requires redesign of the market operation, as it currently
does not scale with the number of active participants [1].
Fig. 1 depicts the legacy imbalance settlement architecture.
Layer 1 includes the SO and the Balance Responsible Parties
(BRPs), while layer 2 comprises the consumers associated
with the corresponding BRP. At layer 1, the BRPs send
the aggregated forecasted generation/consumption to the SO
before the period of operations and receive the imbalance cost
after it. At layer 2, the BRPs offload the imbalance cost to
their consumers, after metering their actual consumption.
The flexible consumers can be incentivized to reduce the
procured imbalances by trading their flexibility [2]. However,
the costs of coordinating, metering, and accounting the fi-
nancial positions of the flexible consumers may restrain the
BRPs to implement such mechanisms [3]. In this respect, the
advent of blockchain protocols is seen as an enabler of low-
cost flexibility markets [4]. The low cost stems from the fact
that, in a blockchain, the state of the system is stored in a
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Fig. 1. Imbalance settlement architecture.
tamper-proof decentralized database [5], removing the need
of centralized coordination.
In this paper, we present a blockchain-based scheme, based
on the Ethereum protocol [5] and implemented at layer 2 of
the imbalance settlement architecture, in which flexible con-
sumers trade their flexibility to minimize the BRP’s imbalance
volume. The flexibility is provided by a demand response
(DR) program in which the flexible consumers adjust their
consumptions according to the imbalance volume. The only
information required by the blockchain-based scheme from the
BRP is the imbalance price, which depends on the imbalances
produced by all the BRPs and the volume of imbalances
to counteract. Subsequently, we show that the scheme is
challenged by the delay of the accounting processes which
can be significant; e.g., the imbalance price is published by
the accounting authorities in Germany with a delay of one
month [6]. Therefore, the BRP can only provide its estimated
value to the layer 2 market, which affects its efficiency.
This motivates us to also use a blockchain at layer 1 and
automatize the task of the accounting authorities, which is
another contribution of the paper.
The presented results show that, at layer 2, the scheme
reduces the flexible consumers’ cost, which is function of
the amount of flexibility, imbalance price and its estimation
error. At the same time, the use of a smart contract keeps
the operating cost for the BRP low, making the solution eco-
nomically profitable. Finally, the presented approach reduces
the imbalance settlement delay at layer 1, and consequently
improves the performance of the layer 2 markets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an
introduction to balancing markets, blockchains and smart con-
tracts. Section III describes the system model, and Section IV
elaborates the design of the blockchain platform. Section V
presents the results and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Design of electricity market
The criteria and trade-offs of electricity market design are
discussed in [7]. In this paper, we focus on the importance
of market facilitation in terms of provision of electricity
at the least cost. The market facilitation criterion includes
equal availability and timeliness of information to all market
participants. In the context of the balancing market, the timely
publication of the imbalance price is particularly critical, as
it provides the incentives to market players to reduce their
financial exposure. However, this principle is challenged by the
delayed publication of the imbalance price and volumes, due
to the inefficient accounting process, caused by the complexity
of the system [6]. The impact of information delay has
been empirically studied, by observing the various strategies
adopted by market players in countries where this delay is
different, i.e. Germany and the Netherlands [8].
B. Blockchain and smart contracts
A blockchain protocol leverages on cryptographic primitives
to securely replicate a database, that stores the states of
accounts, within a network of agents. The state of an account
consists of its accumulated credit and a general purpose
storage memory. To read or modify the state of an account, one
can only use pre-defined functions. Together, the state and its
set of functions form a data structure called smart contract [5].
The smart contract is deployed in the blockchain database by
its owner. To incentivize agents to store a copy of the database,
every modification of the contract, called a “transaction”, is
subject to the payment of a fee, under the form of credit. The
fee increases with the portion of account’s storage memory
that is modified. This also discourages unnecessary updates to
the contract, i.e. spamming attacks. Finally, to keep the copies
of the database consistent, the history of updates is stored
as a tamper-proof concatenated list, known as a blockchain.
To avoid proliferation of different lists, only one agent can
apply the modifications in each time period, by appending
new information blocks. This agent can be elected according
to various mechanisms, e.g. the proof-of-work [5], while the
appended blocks contain collection of transactions that do not
conflict with those already included in previous blocks.
C. Blockchain applications in the smart grid
Recently, there has been a rising interest in the area of
blockchain applications for smart grids [9]–[12]. The basic
applications are the peer-to-peer energy trading [9], where the
accounts’ states are simply used as financial ledger, or the
certification of origin [10], in which generators attest their
production on the blockchain. More advanced applications use
a smart contract to supervise optimization problems [11], or to
implement distributed auctions in microgrids (MGs) [4]. It has
also been shown that a smart contract can be used to track the
control history of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and
thus establish fairness [12].
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Fig. 2. Time organization of the operations.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In the electricity markets, there are several operation periods
during a day, called schedule time units (STUs), or balancing
periods [7], see Fig. 2. Each period corresponds to a generation
and consumption plan. We model a simplified electricity
market in which the energy, relative to a STU, can be traded
in two different stages: day ahead (DA) and intra-day (ID),
see Fig. 2, which are presented in the following text.
The agents in the system are: at layer 1, a SO and the BRPs,
and, at layer 2, a BRP and the associated flexible and inflexible
consumers, see Fig. 1.
A. Layer 2
A set U of U flexible consumers and a set V of V inflexible
consumers are associated to a BRP. A consumer v ∈ V is
characterized by a load profile modeled as a household, and
sporadically communicates with the BRP, to report its metered
consumption in each STU, which is qv kWh.
The flexible consumer u ∈ U is modeled as an electric
vehicle (EV) charging station, cf. [13]. The maximum amount
of energy delivered to u in a STU is Qu kWh, but u can decide
to curtail the energy absorption to qu, Qmin,u ≤ qu ≤ Qu,
by decreasing its power acceptance rate at the expense of a
longer charging time. To simplify the scenario, we assume that
Qmin,u = Qmin and Qu = Q, ∀u ∈ U , and assume a linear
utility function:
f(qu) = πuqu,
where πu is the marginal utility of u, representing its willing-
ness to vary the energy absorption.
Finally, the BRP owns a renewable energy source (RES)
that produces Qw kWh in a STU.
B. Layer 1
The SO contracts the balancing energy from a pre-qualified
set of Balance Service Providers (BSPs) [6]. We assume that
the SO receives enough offers from BSPs to safely operate the
grid, and we only focus on the BRPs wholesale market.
In the DA market stage, see Fig. 2, energy provisions are
contracted for the entire next day, based on estimated values;
these values are indicated with the tilde symbol in the rest of
the paper, to distinguish them from their actual values. The
BRP estimates the load profile of the V households, and the
energy produced by the RES, Q̃w. We assume that the estima-
tion error of the consumers’ profile and RES production are
Gaussian, with zero mean and standard deviations σh and σw,
respectively. At the closure of the DA market, each BRP sends
to the SO the forecasted aggregated consumption/generation
for each STU. In a generic STU, it is:
q̃ =
∑
v∈V
q̃v +
∑
u∈U
q̃u − Q̃w,
where the terms on the right correspond to inflexible con-
sumers, flexible consumers, and energy source, respectively.
During each STU, see Fig. 2, the SO is in charge of the
real-time balancing. In this phase, it monitors the grid and
sends control commands to the BSPs, activating their offers.
After each STU, the BSPs are rewarded for the provision of
the balancing service and the BRPs charged for the procured
imbalances. The metered absorbed energy by the BRP in a
STU is:
q =
∑
v∈V
qv +
∑
u∈U
qu −Qw.
Thus, the imbalance volume procured by the BRP in a STU
is q − q̃; when q − q̃ > 0, the SO provided down-regulation,
whereas in the opposite case, up-regulation.
As an example, Fig. 3 shows the load curve sent from the
BRP to the SO for a day, in a scenario with high penetration
of EVs. The integral of the difference between the forecasted
consumption and the metered one constitutes the imbalance
volume produced by the households.
C. Imbalances accounting
The accounting authority collects the measurements of
absorbed energy from sensors, which is an operation that
requires TIC minutes, see Fig. 2. The accounting process,
which serves to define the imbalance price and volumes of
each BRP, has duration of TACC minutes, and is described in
the following text. To simplify the presentation, we assume
that the balancing cost associated to a BRP, relatively to a
STU, depends on the imbalance price and volume as:
JBM = π
? · (q − q̃). (1)
The imbalance price π?, in this work measured in e/kWh,
is formulated differently in each country, to provide the right
incentives to the specific markets [6], [14].
All BRPs receive the information about the real imbalance
price with a delay of TIC + TACC minutes from the end of the
corresponding STU, i.e. the delay includes metering delay and
accounting delay [15]. The BRPs contract energy for a STU by
using an estimate of the imbalance price, denoted by π̃?, which
is based on the historical record of the actual imbalance price.
The estimation error π? − π̃? is affected by the publication
delay; we remark that this error has only been empirically
characterized in literature, cf. [8] and that it depends on the
adopted estimation technique, cf. [16], [17]. In this work, we
assume that the BRP disposes a Gaussian estimate of π?, i.e.
(π? − π̃?) ∼ N (0, σ2BM). It is reasonable to assume that σBM
increases with the publication delay.
The inflexible consumer v ∈ V is charged according to a
fixed price, proportionally to its consumption:
Jv = (πC + πG) · qv, (2)
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Fig. 3. An example of demand plan (households and EVs associated with a
BRP) and its realization. Each marker corresponds to a STU.
where πC e/kWh is the price of electricity and πG e/kWh is
the price for the imbalances. The adoption of fixed price for
the imbalances avoids the exposition of v to the variable cost
(1), but also contains a margin for the BRP.
The flexible consumer u ∈ U is charged for the absorbed
energy, similarly to the inflexible one, but is exposed to the
imbalance cost, proportionally to its consumption:
Ju =
(
πC + π
? · q − q̃
|
∑
u∈U qu|+ |Qw|
)
· qu. (3)
The BRP earns from selling the electricity and from the
margin on the imbalances of inflexible consumers, and is
charged of the imbalances caused by the RES. Its resulting
imbalance cost is:
JBRP =− πC ·
(∑
v∈V
qv +
∑
u∈U
qu
)
− πG ·
∑
v∈V
qv (4)
+ π? · q − q̃
|
∑
u∈U qu|+ |Qw|
·Qw.
D. Flexibility market: Demand Response (DR) program
The implementation of a flexibility market at layer 2 is
motivated by the fact that before the ID closure time, the
BRP amends its estimation of power generated by the RES,
thanks to improved forecast. Specifically, the BRP obtains the
information about its estimation error Qw − Q̃w. Therefore,
it can reduce the cost in (1) by buying or selling electricity
on the ID market, see Fig. 2, or by internally balancing it.1
In this paper, we investigate the second option. The flexibility
is procured by a DR program that is permitted to curtail the
energy delivered to the EV stations, when the RES is under-
producing. We note that previous works showed the potential
of this application [18].
As the amount of energy procured by the DR program is
the difference between the maximum and actual absorption
from flexible consumers, i.e. UQ−
∑
u∈U qu, the normalized
amount of energy not compensated by the program is:
QDR =
(Qw − Q̃w)− (UQ−
∑
u∈U qu)
Qw − Q̃w
, (5)
1In a scenario where the BRP does not receive any forecast information, it
can still speculate on the sign of imbalance price, see [17].
defined only for Qw 6= Q̃w. The BRP allocates a fraction α,
0 ≤ α ≤ 1, of the amount payed by inflexible consumers to
cover the imbalances, i.e. πG
∑
v∈V qv (second term of (2)), to
incentivize the flexible prosumers in reducing QDR. The cost
for the BRP with the DR program becomes:
JDRBRP =− πC ·
(∑
v∈V
qv +
∑
u∈U
qu
)
(6)
− πG
∑
v∈V
qv · (1− α+ α ·QDR)
+ π? · q − q̃
|
∑
u∈U qu|+ |Qw|
·Qw.
The difference with (4) is that, in (6), part of the quantity
πG
∑
v∈V qv is allocated for the DR program incentives;
furthermore, the fraction 1 − QDR is effectively payed to the
flexible consumers, as the DR program might only partially
procure the required energy. Thanks to the incentive, the cost
for the flexible consumer u becomes:
JDRu = Ju − α · (1−QDR) · πG
∑
v∈V
qv ·
Q− qu
UQ−
∑
u∈U qu
(7)
when UQ 6=
∑
u∈U qu, otherwise J
DR
u = Ju. Note that the
incentive is weighted by the contribution of u to the DR
program. We write the cost for the flexible consumers u,
including the utility cost, as:
J?u = J
DR
u − f(qu).
The DR program aims to minimize the total cost for flexible
consumers, but is challenged by the fact that the imbalance
price and actual households consumption, π? and
∑
v∈V qv ,
are unknown a priori. For this reason, in the following opti-
mization the program uses the approximated values π? = π̃?
and
∑
v∈V qv =
∑
v∈V q̃v , respectively:
min
qu,u∈U
∑
u∈U
J?u (8)
s.t. Qmin ≤ qu ≤ Q, (9)
0 ≤ QDR ≤ 1. (10)
IV. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SOLUTION
We propose to use blockchains at both layers of the market,
but with different purpose. At layer 1, a smart contract is
used to increase the automation of the accounting mechanism,
aiming at reducing its duration. At layer 2, a different smart
contract supports the resolution of (8).
A. Layer 1
A smart contract, owned by the SO, is deployed on a
blockchain for each STU. Only the addresses of qualified
BRPs are entitled to modify its state. The functionalities of
the contract, depicted in Fig. 4, are:
(F1) Receive a credit cover from each BRP. The credit cover is
a mechanism used in the electricity market that prevents
agents from not paying the future balancing cost [15].
time
Layer 2 contract
SO
BRP
Flexible consumers
Real time (STU)Day Ahead Intra Day
Layer 1 contract
Accounting
F2Deploy F3
F1
F1 F5F5
Deploy
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G1 G3
G5
G6
G4
Other 
BRPs
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Fig. 4. Sequence of operations on the contracts during time. Red arrows
indicate functions that transfer credit from/to the smart contracts.
(F2) After the STU, receive the list of activated balancing
offers from the SO, with their corresponding cost.
(F3) Receive the metered generation/consumption. This func-
tion is used by the sensors, installed on the grid. We
assume that the sensors do not show byzantine behavior,
meaning that they timely send valid information.
(F4) Compute the price π? for the STU, according to the
German pricing formula (“reBAP”) [6]. This function is
called upon the reception of all the measurements.
(F5) Settle the imbalance position. Each BRP can use this
function to receive the difference between the credit cover
and the actual imbalance cost, see (1).
We briefly outline a qualitative comparison of the pro-
posed approach with the state-of-art imbalances accounting
mechanism. The proposed solution removes the burden of the
accounting process, giving a negligible TACC. The availability
and transparency of information are ensured by the observabil-
ity of the blockchain from all the agents. Finally, this solution
provides a seamless credit cover mechanism.
B. Layer 2
The resolution of the non-convex problem (8) is delegated
to a flexible consumer û ∈ U , chosen randomly in each
STU. A smart contract is used by the BRP to indicate û and
to publish the information needed for the resolution of the
problem; the delegated flexible consumer resolves the problem
and publishes the result via the same smart contract.
The functionalities of the contract, also depicted in Fig. 4,
are:
(G1) Receive, and store, the value of marginal utility, πu, and
credit cover from each u ∈ U . Initialize qu = Q, u ∈ U .
(G2) Receive the values of π̃?,
∑
v∈V q̃v , Qw and Q̃w from the
BRP. In addition, receive the index û of the flexible con-
sumer delegated to solve the problem. The information is
stored in the state of the smart contract, and is available
to all flexible consumers.
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
πC 0.05 e/kWh πG 0.03 e/kWh
Qw 500 kWh Qmin 0.925 kWh
σh 6 σv 15
Q 3.7 kWh γ 0.01
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
Imbalance price [euro/kWh]
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 = 0
 = 0.1
 = 0.15
 = 0.175
 = 0.2
Fig. 5. Energy not balanced by the DR program.
(G3) Receive the result of (8), i.e. qu, ∀u ∈ U . This function
can be only called by consumer û, after the local resolu-
tion of the problem.
(G4) Destroy the contract. This function can only be called by
the BRP, and it returns the credits to the corresponding
flexible consumers. It entitles the BRP to not accept the
flexibility offer, and is used in case that the solution is
not profitable for the BRP.
(G5) Offload the cost from layer 1, according to the pricing
scheme. This function is called by the BRP upon recep-
tion of metered consumption.
(G6) Settle the position of the flexible consumers using (7).
This is called by each flexible consumer and causes the
transfer of credit to its account.
This solution permits a minimum intervention of the BRP
in the DR program, as the only required actions are to deploy
the smart contract and to provide the initial values, by means
of (G2). At the same time, all the flexible consumers can audit
the correctness of the resolution of the problem.
V. RESULTS
The results are obtained via numerical simulation of an
example power grid. The smart contracts are implemented in
Solidity, a programming language supported by Ethereum, and
deployed on a private blockchain. The grid simulator interacts
with the blockchain via a Node.js script.
A. Layer 2 simulation
We simulate a power system in which there are V = 3500
households, U = 70 EV charging stations acting as flexible
consumers, and a small RES owned by the BRP. The system is
parametrized as in Table I, while the forecasted load profiles of
households and EVs are plotted in Fig. 3. The utility function
of u ∈ U is characterized by the marginal price πu, uniformly
generated in [0.20, 0.50] e/kWh.
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Fig. 6. Cost comparison when (a) α = 0.175 and (b) α = 0.15.
First, we analyze the case in which flexible consumers are
called to provide up-regulation in response to a deficit of
30 kWh, corresponding to 2σh, caused by the RES. Fig. 5
shows the amount of energy curtailed by the DR program as
function of the imbalance price, for different values of the
reward parameter α. When the reward increases, the flexible
consumers are more stimulated to curtail their absorption.2
In Fig. 6, we set α = 0.175 and α = 0.15 and compare
the average cost for the agents, for different values of the
imbalance price, in the cases with and without flexibility. The
cost for the consumers is not reported, as they are exposed
to a fixed price, see (2). Note that, as the imbalance cost
increases, the flexible consumers decrease their consumptions,
and therefore their cost. This also means that their EV will
charge more slowly, see discussion in Sec. V-B. The figures
also show that, from the BRP perspective, when α = 0.175,
the DR program is never beneficial, as the amount of credit
allocated for the reward is too high and the reduction of
income on selling energy too low, compared to the reduction of
the imbalance cost due to the RES. On the other hand, when
α = 0.15, the DR program decreases the cost for the BRP,
when the imbalance price is higher than 0.225 e/kWh. We
remark that the results only consider positive imbalance prices,
because the modeled system can only provide up-regulation.
In comparison with the standard implementations of DR
programs [19], the proposed one offloads part of the operating
cost from the BRP to the consumers. The operating cost of
the blockchain-based DR program depends on the number
of transactions that it requires, and on the fee associated
2This also reduces the margin of the BRP, but the optimal selection of α
is not studied in this work.
with a transaction, that is decided by the agents that append
blocks to the blockchain, see Sec. II-B. In a STU, the BRP
sends only two transactions, corresponding to functions (G2)
and (G5) of Sec. IV. The generic flexible consumers also
send two transactions, see functions (G1) and (G6). However,
the flexible consumer delegated to resolve the problem is
required to send the values qu ∀u ∈ U , see (G3). To limit the
amount of fee, to be payed for this transaction, this consumer
only sends updates for those that operate curtailment, i.e. for
which qu < Q. Another option for the implementation of
the blockchain-based DR program is to employ decentralized
optimization algorithms [11], with the additional benefit that
they also keep πu private. However, compared to the proposed
solution, they increase the amount of information exchanged
to reach agreement, hence the number of transactions.
B. Integration with layer 1
We simulate the performance of the DR program under a
variable imbalance price, over different STUs, based on the
data set published by the operator TenneT, for the German
market. In this country, the duration of a STU is 15 minutes.
Fig. 7 reports the histogram of the price values during a
period of one month (November 2017). Initially, we assume
perfect knowledge of the price value, while the errors on the
forecasted RES production and households consumption are
randomly generated, according to the parameters reported in
Table I. The DR program is executed, i.e. the smart contract
is deployed, only for the STUs in which the price π? is
positive and the RES is expected to cause an energy deficit.
In fact, this corresponds to the case of positive imbalance
cost, see (1). The marginal utilities of flexible consumers are
randomly generated, as in Sec. V-A, but kept fixed during the
month. The design parameter α is set to 0.15.
The average gains for each agent, during the considered
month, are showed in Table II. Columns “A” report the base
cost of electricity, associated with the fixed price πC; columns
“B” the cost of imbalances and “C” the one of DR program,
plus the gain associated to πG in the case of the BRP. The DR
program reduces the amount of electricity sold by the BRP,
see the difference between columns “A”, but compensates this
loss with the reduction of the imbalance cost, see columns
“B”. However, in this case study, the BRP observes a negative
gain, −697.26 e, due to the excessive amount of incentive
payed to the flexible consumers, see columns “C”. We also
note that only the most flexible consumers, i.e. those with low
marginal price πu, take profit from the DR program, as they
reduce their absorption and receive the reward, proportionally
to the reduction. This reflects in a remarkable gain at the end
of the month, see Table II. On the other hand, the average
flexible consumer does not have a remarkable gain from the
DR program. This is also the case for the inflexible consumers,
as they are billed with fixed price.
Further, Fig. 8 shows that, during the considered month,
flexible consumers with lower marginal price experience lower
average cost of electricity for a STU. In this realization of the
-0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4
Imbalance price * [euro/kWh]
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 f
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 [
0
-1
]
Fig. 7. Histogram of the observed imbalance price during one month, with
bin size 0.01 e/kWh.
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Fig. 8. Average cost as function of the marginal utility of flexible consumers.
process, there are four flexible consumers (two have marginal
utility 0.2 e), that are selected for the energy curtailment.
Finally, we investigate the impact of delayed publication of
imbalance price information on the layer 2 market dynamics.
In Sec. III-C, we have modeled the estimation error on the
imbalance price as a Gaussian variable with variance σBM. If
the estimated value, π̃?, is negative, but the real value, π?, is
positive, a false negative occurs: the BRP does not deploy the
DR contract, missing the business opportunity for the flexible
consumers. In contrast, when π? < 0 and π̃? > 0, i.e., when
a false positive occurs, the DR contract is implemented even
if the system needs down-regulation, causing a cost for both
the BRP and the flexible consumers. Table III shows that,
when this error increases, false positive and negative decisions
increase. With the availability of perfect information, the BRP
would have deployed a contract in the 75% of the STUs.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have studied an implicit DR program, in which the BRP
lowers its imbalance cost by leveraging on the flexibility of
its consumers that are stimulated with incentives to lower the
imbalance cost. We proposed to use blockchain smart contracts
at two layers of the balancing market and discussed the ben-
efits of this solution. At layer 1, a smart contract permitted to
reduce the delay of publication of the imbalance price, causing
a positive effect on the market dynamics of layer 2. The
blockchain-based solution also satisfies the market facilitation
criterion. The problem of implementing DR programs, with
low operating cost for the BRP, has been solved by means of
another smart contract at layer 2. Possible improvements to
the scheme are (i) the adoption of decentralized optimization
TABLE II
COSTS DURING ONE MONTH
Without flexibility [e] With flexibility [e] Gain [e]
A B C Total A B C Total
BRP -135940 -118.82 -59187 -195245.82 -135710 -305.56 -58533 -19454.85 -697.26
Avg. flex. consum. 532.80 -0.69 0 531.91 529.50 -2.11 -9.35 518.04 13.87
Most flex. consum. 532.80 -0.69 0 531.91 484.76 -2.13 -134.30 348.33 183.58
Less flex. consum. 532.80 -0.69 0 531.91 532.8 -2.11 0 530.69 1.22
Inflex. consum. 45.10 45.10 0
TABLE III
PERCENTAGE OF DECISIONAL ERRORS OF THE BRP DURING ONE MONTH
σBM False negative [%] False positive [%]
0.001 0.3 0.3
0.005 1.9 1.5
0.01 3.8 2.8
0.02 6.3 4.7
algorithms with fast convergence, to reduce the amount of
information shared by consumers, while keeping low the
operating cost, and (ii) the inclusion of the cost of sending
transactions, i.e. their fee, in problem (8). Finally, the proposed
scenario is characterized by absence of down-regulation. The
future work should investigate the inclusion of new flexible
consumers types, to increase their diversity and therefore the
efficiency of the program.
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